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I. INTRODUCTION

Since Congress began deregulation of the domestic airline industry in
1978,1 airlines have transformed and consolidated, resulting in large increases
in efficiency and profitability for a small number of remaining
"competitors." 2 United, American, and Delta - the "Big Three" airlines account for approximately 55% of all U.S. air traffic, 3 and the five largest
airlines control more than 70% ofthe U.S. domestic market.4 Since there are
few other competitors, many less popular routes have monopoly status, and
BA. 1998, Florida State University;J.D. candidate May 2001, University of Miami School of
Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Gary Minda of the Brooklyn Law School and Professor Alan
Swan of the University of Miami School of Law for their insight and guidance in the preparation of this
comment.
I
See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-192,94 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
2
See Scott Thurston, DeltaAgain Posts Billion-Dollar Profit, ATLANTA CONST.,July 20, 1999, at
1E (reporting that Delta Airlines earned $1.1 billion in its fiscal year endingJune 30,1999, and $1 billion
for the fiscal year endingJune 30,1998).
See Jack Nease, Airline Deals Would have High Price - For Travelers, SuN-SENTINAL (Fort
Lauderdale, Florida), Dec. 17, 1996, at 3D.
4
See Richard Whitaker, And Then There Were Four.. ., AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1998, at 7.
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the collective airline industry, with the exception ofcertain large markets, has
the characteristics and pricing power of an oligopoly.' Due to the
oligopolistic pricing structure, many routes have disproportionately high
airfares.
This comment will examine the high barriers to entry in the airline
industry, created primarily by government and the airline industry itself,
which largely renders the existence or threat of start-up competition unable
to serve as a deterrent to oligopolistic pricing. The primary government
created barriers are the prohibition of cabotage 6 within the United States,
foreign ownership restrictions upon airlines, and the anti-competitive
management of local airports. The primary industry created barriers to entry
are anti-competitive behavior and large economies of scale. The role and
effectiveness of competition laws, as applied to mitigate the effects of these
barriers, are examined as well.
After establishing that barriers to entry are needlessly contributing to the
oligopolic status of the U.S. domestic airline industry, this comment will
then explore how the Department of Transportation's (DOT) practice of
granting antitrust immunity to alliances of foreign and domestic airlines is in
conflict with the pro-competition goals of the DOT itself and the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Lastly, this comment looks at solutions to
enhance competition, and new problems that will arise as a result.
II. AIRLINE REGULATION HISTORY
A. Domestic
The United States initiated airline regulation with the passing of the Air
Commerce Act of 1926,' which was expanded by the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938.8 The Civil Aeronautics Act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
which was turned into the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1939. 9 The
purpose of the CAB was to regulate: (1) market entry and exit, including the
power to grant operating permits and to approve, allocate, and assign routes
s

See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, LaborRelations on tLheAidlines: The Railway LaborAct in the Era

of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1541 (1990).
6

"Cabotage," isthe privilege to transport passengers from one destination to another within a

country other than that of the carrier at issue. See infia Part III.D.
7
Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926); see also Seth Warner,
Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investrentand Cabotage RestrictionsKeep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U.

L. REv. 277,287 (1993).
a
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. S401, et seq. (current version at 49 U.S.C. S1301,
et seq. (1996)); see also Warner, supra note 7, at 288.
9
See Warner, supra note 7, at 288.
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and service to certain communities;' ° (2) rates and air fares;" and (3) anticompetitive practices.' 2 The CAB regulated the airline industry from 19381984, presiding over all civil interstate air travel and civil foreign air travel
regarding the United States. In the wake of high prices and unprofitable
airlines, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided for the CAB to be
dissolved in 1984.13
B. International
At the Paris Convention of 1919, a treaty was created providing for each
nation to have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
their territory. Eventually ratified by thirty-two nations,' 4 this treaty was the
primary document governing international civil aviation until the Chicago
Convention of 1944, when comprehensive rules were established to govern
nearly every aspect of international civil air transportation."5 The Chicago
Convention rules, which were eventually adopted by 180 nations, maintained
the position that nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above their territory. 6 Subsequently, in accordance with the Chicago
Convention, nations have signed bilateral agreements that expand the rights
that they confer upon each other.'"
The United States has signed bilateral "Open Skies" 8 agreements with
forty-three other nations, many of them European. 9 "Open Skies"
agreements generally incorporate rules allowing the airlines of the two
nations to the agreement to provide as much passenger and cargo capacity
between the two nations as the airlines desire. This has caused controversy
in the European Community (EC), mainly because the EC has created a

10
1
12
13
1

is
16

See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. S 401 (repealed 52 Stat. 987).
See id. at §1002(d), (repealed 52 Stat. 1018-19).
See id. at 5 408(a) (currentversion at 49 U.S.C. S 40101(1996)).
SeegenerallyAirline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. SS1301-1542 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
See I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR 1Aw4 (6th rev. ed., 1997).
See id. at 5.

See id. at 12.
See id.
is
The U.S. defined "Open Skies" according to the following criteria: 1) open entry on all routes;
2) unrestricted route and traffic rights; 3) liberalized price setting, 4) liberal charter arrangements; 5)
liberal cargo regime; 6) prompt conversion of earnings to hard currency and prompt remission to
homeland; 7) open code sharing; 8) rights to control airport functions; 9) pro-competitive provisions on
commercial opportunities; and 10) non-discriminatory operation and access for computer reservation
systems. See Mead Jennings, Definingan Open Skies Concept, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1992, at 129.
19
See Before theAviation Subcomm. of the House Transportationand InfrastructureComm., 105th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Rodney Slater, Secretary of Transportation) available at
http'//199.79.179.73/tabula/teat/Slater2.htm (on file with author).
17
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Single European Market. As a result, the transport commissioner of the EC
has brought suit against EC member states that have negotiated bilateral
"Open Skies" agreements with the United States.20
The "Open Skies" agreements foster competition in international
aviation. DOT Assistant Secretary Patrick Murphy has released findings that
the average fares in US-Europe "Open Skies" markets dropped by more than
5% in 1996-1997, while at the same time fares between the non- "Open
Skies" United States-United Kingdom routes rose by 6%.21
Separate from "Open Skies" arrangements, the current regulatory
scheme that is used to define the rights of an aircraft in a foreign nation is the
eight "freedoms" regime." The first five "freedoms" were recognized at the
Chicago Convention of 1944, and the last three, including cabotage, are not
as widely recognized. They are:
1. the right to fly across the territory of a foreign country without
landing;
2. the right to land in a foreign country for non-commercial
purposes such as refueling;
3. the right of a carrier licensed in one state to put down, in the
territory of another state, passengers, freight, and mail taken up
in the state in which it is licensed;
4. the right of an air carrier licensed in one state to take on, in the
territory of another state, passengers, freight and mail for offloading in the state in which it is licensed;
5. the right of an air carrier to transport passengers, freight, and
mail between two states other than the one in which it is
licensed;
6. the right to take on passengers, mail, and cargo in one state and
to put them down in a third state after a stopover in the state of
registration of the aircraft;
7. the right to take on and put down passengers, mail, and cargo
between two states without stopping over in the aircraft's state
of registration;

2D

21

20
21

See Tom Gill, Brussels Gears Up to TackleAiiation, AIRUNE BuS., Apr. 1999, at 20.
See Tom Gill, Little Hope of Early US- UK Open Skies, AIRUNE BUS., Feb. 1999, at 11.

"
See G. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The ExtratritorialApplication of United States and
European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sator,31 GEo. WASH.J. INT'L L & ECON. 185,
212 n. 197 (1997/1998).
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8. the right to take up and put down passengers, mail, and cargo
solely within the territory of a state other than the aircraft's state
of registration (also known as cabotage).
Within the United States cabotage is strictly prohibited, preventing any
non-U.S. flagged carrier from competing on domestic routes. This single
barrier to entry, discussed further below, completely eliminates foreign
competition.

III. BARREIR TO ENTRY
The airline industry retains oligopolistic status due primarily to the
enormous barriers to entry for new competition, which were created by
governments2" and major airlines." Without the widespread existence or
threat of start-up competition, there is no deterrent to oligopolistic pricing
in most markets. According to economist Joe Bain:
Even in automistically organized industries, barriers to entry may,
under certain conditions, result in a long-term elevation of prices
and profits and a restriction of output . . . . Each of the few
established sellers - whether they act collectively or singly - will
appraise the condition of entry and, anticipating that entry may occur
if price exceeds a given level, will regulate his price policies
accordingly. There will thus be a sort of "recognized
interdependence" of actions not only among established sellers but
between established sellers and potential entrants. In this event,
variations in the condition of entry may be expected to have
substantial effects on the behavior of established sellers, even though
over long intervals actual entry seldom or never takes place.26
While the largest airlines are restricted in number, they do not necessarily
have diseconomies of scale. The "hub and spoke" system is extremely

2

24

See id.
See FANVOST,AIRPORTBUSNESS PRACnCESANDTHEIRIMPACTONAIRLINECOMPETITION

33 (Oct. 1999).
5
See United States v. AMR Corp., No. 99-1180-JTM (D. Kan. filed May 13, 1999), availableat
http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cascs/f2400/2438.htm (an ongoing case alleging predatory pricing by AMR

Corp., parent ofAnerican Airlines); seegeerallyKevin O'Toole,AmericanJustice?,AIRLINE BUS.,July 1999,
at 66.
2

JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3-4 (1956).
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efficient, and it serves as a barrier to entry that can only be matched by other
airlines with a similar level of efficiency. Any new entrant in the industry
must either have a "hub and spoke" system or another type of efficiency in
order to be competitive.

A. Government Created Barriers to Entry
The government has created barriers to entry by misallocating airport
and gate usage. U.S. Senator John McCain of Arizona, feels that cases of
predatory behavior in recent years have been "numerous and compelling." 7
According to Senator McCain, "[t]he major airlines have been a great
impediment in that they have, to some effect, choked off new competition.
I am glad the DOT is investigating those practices, but at the same time we
also have to remove the anti-competition restrictions such as slot control at
airports. "2'The lack of available gates and take-off slots within individual
airports has long been exacerbated by exclusive-use lease arrangements and
majority-in-interest clauses that permit a defacto management of airports by
the major airlines who sign long-term leases for gates.2 This de facto
management is possible because some airlines have clauses in their leases that
permit them to veto airport improvements intended to create more
capacity." The DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are
currently investigating these business practices.3' Through the Aviation
Competition Enhancement Act, 32 Senator McCain proposes a mandated slot
allocation to new entrants and to a limited number of incumbent carriers
where the capacity exists. Where capacity does not exist, Senator McCain
proposes a gradual withdrawal of the slots that were grandfathered to the
major airlines when deregulation ended in 1985.' 3
Of course, the major airlines are opposed to this type of slot allocation,
and they claim that the Aviation Competition Enhancement Act is a form of
reregulation. 4 McCain counters by saying "[t]he barriers of slot control

27
20
29

See Karen Walker, Champion of the Cause,AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1998, at 38.
See id.
See id.

See FA/OST, supra note 24, at 42.
SeeB~aretheSubcomm. onAtiation, Comm. on TransponationandInfrastructure,106th Cong. (1999)
(Statement ofJohn Coleman, Director of Avaiation Analysis, Department of Transportation concerning
air transport in Bangor Maine) available at http://tabula.ost.dot.gov/test/Coleman2.htm (on file with
author). The Federal Aviation Administration is organized under the United States Department of
Transportation.
32
Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997, S. 1331, 105th Cong. (1997).
33
See Walker, supra note 27.
3
See id.
31
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were a regulatory act to start with. That's like saying you shouldn't give the
Department of Justice the power to go after
people who engage in anti"3
competitive behavior. That's reregulation? s
B. Airline Created Barriers to Entry
The "hub" and "spoke" system arose after deregulation as the airlines
struggled to increase efficiencies and profitability. Today, leading domestic
airlines are brand name carriers that dominate hub airports in large cities and
feed out into large and small city based spokes.36 The basic premise of this
system is that each spoke feeds all of the other spokes, or a passenger travels
on only one spoke. Spoke destinations are cities of all sizes, but the largest
cities are consistently served by several major carriers, and can be both a hub
and a spoke to different airlines. Since the hub and spoke economies of scale
cannot be matched by a new competitor airline, a large airline has a greater
profit margin and more price flexibility, creating a formidable barrier to the
maintenance of a new entry when airfare competition heats up. With
economic power tilted toward the larger airlines, the low cost airlines have
alleged predatory pricing in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws.37
When a low cost carrier (LCC) establishes service on a route, it is often
between a hub and a spoke where there is a perceived opportunity to gain
market share by charging lower fares, while still making a profit. In response
to the new competition, large carriers temporarily lower their prices and
expand service to become competitive with the LCC. Due to hub and spoke
efficiencies, large carriers may not need to lower their prices below marginal
cost in order to be competitive, but they often have anyway." Eventually, the
LCC can no longer bear the losses of servicing a particular city. The major
airline then returns to reduced capacity and raises fares on the particular
route, reaping monopoly or oligopoly level profits.39

33

36

Id.
See Michael E. Levine,AnitrustLawronssm theAidinelndustry:AidineDgulation:APerspective,

60 ANTrrRusT L.J. 687,691 (1991).
3
See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993)
(holding that for predatory pricing recovery under either S2 of the Sherman act or for primary-line price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, the plaintiff must show (1) complained of prices are
below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs, and (2) the competitor must have a reasonable prospect
of recouping its investment).
38
See Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920 (Proposed Apr. 10, 1998).
39

See id.
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In short distance markets, without low-fare competition, inflation adjusted fares are substantially higher, not lower, than pre-deregulation fares.'
When deregulation occurred,41 it was widely thought that the contestability
of markets would provide ample competition, but as applied to airlines, the
barriers to entry are often too high to discipline markets.4 2 Therefore, young,
low-cost airlines are not thriving in this environment.
C. Antitrust Enforcement
The rigorous enforcement of antitrust law can curb predatory behavior
by major airlines if it can be proven that the major airline is irrationally
pricing below marginal cost in the desire to force the competitor out of the
market. As described by Kenneth Quinn, a Washington, D.C. attorney and
former chair of the American Bar Association's Air and Space Law Forum,
proving predatory behavior can be difficult. According to Quinn, "[d] rawing
the line between tough competition that is beneficial to consumers, and
predatory tactics that are harmful to competition, often is difficult."43 There
is no bright line test to delineate between tough competition and predatory
pricing, and it must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the DOJ.
The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, through Roger
Fones, the chief of the transportation section, claims "our antitrust division
has a strong interest in assuring that a new entry is not thwarted by anticompetitive behavior by incumbent airlines." 4 The DOT and the DOJ share
the responsibility for the enforcement of the antitrust laws against airlines.45
While the DOJ is the primary antitrust authority in the review of domestic

40

See DOT, COMPETTON IN THE US DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY: TE

NEED FOR A

POLICY TO PREVENT UNFAIR PRACTICES (Rev. ed., May 1999) available at
http'//www.dot.gov/affairs/dkt3713.htm. (last visited Sept. 15,2000) (on file with author).
41
Prior to deregulation, the CAB subsidized airfares on less popular routes with higher airfares
on more popular routes.
42
See Levine, supra note 36, at 688.
43
Dave Knibb, Fairor Foul, AIRLINE BUS., Oct. 1997, at 40.
44
Id.
45
The Department of'Justice and the Federal Trade Commission share jurisdiction over federal
government enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, with certain industries assigned to one agency or
the other by statute. For example, airlines are assigned to the DOJ by 15 U.S.C. S45 (2001). In certain
instances, enforcement jurisdiction is also shared between a primary enforcement agency and a
department of the executive branch. In airline antitrust enforcement, the DOJ and the DOT share
jurisdiction pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 41712 (2001). Criminal enforcement and other punitive proceedings
are enforced exclusively by the DOJ, the arm of the executive branch empowered to use punitive
enforcement measures.
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acquisitions and alliances,' the DOT has the ability to grant antitrust
immunity to airline alliances when it is in the public interest4 7
Explaining the Antitrust Division's opinion on different incumbent
airline reactions to a LCC, Fones says that fare discounting in response to a
LCC is not a concern, and neither is the addition of capacity when the lower
pricing stimulates the extra demand. 4 An airline gets closer to a violation
when the incumbent adds flights in order to fly at similar times, or when
capacity is added beyond reasonable projections.4 9 The incumbent firmly
commits a violation when it decides to bring new service to routes that the
LCC serves."s
According to Fones, the DOJ goes with the presumption that "the
incumbents pre-entry schedules are efficiently operating its network."5'
Therefore, when changes in capacity, schedules, or routing are made upon
entry by a LCC, the DOJ demands an explanation. 2 A classic example of a
predatory antitrust violation occurred in 1993 when Northwest Airlines
decided to revive its formerly abandoned Minneapolis-Reno route and create
a mini-hub in Reno. Since Reno Air had also begun providing RenoMinneapolis service in 1993, Northwest overlapped much of Reno Air's
network 3 While no action was ever filed against Northwest Airlines, the
DOT's threat of a cease and desist order forced Northwest Airlines to
discontinue its predatory behavior.'
When price cuts are made, the basic test is whether an incumbent's
pricing strategy makes sense only if it is designed to drive the new entrant
56
away." If the strategy is rational on other grounds, the pricing is legal.
According to Fones, "[i] f there exists no prospect for recoupment, then we
can be confident that the incumbent's pricing strategy benefits consumers.
If the incumbent charges "irrationally" low prices in the short run, but can

See Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Mortimer L. Downey, Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Transportation,
concerning air transportation in Charleston, South Carolina) available at
http//152.119.36.5/test/Doneyl.htm (on file with author).
47
See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. SS 41308-41309 (1996).
4
See Knibb, supra note 43, at 40.
49
See id.
50
See id.
4

"1

See id.

s2
5

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

54

55
56
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more than make up for them with higher prices in the long run, illegal
predation may be occurring. " s
The DOJ will also examine whether losses can be recouped by an LCC
discontinuing service in other competing markets. For example, if an
incumbent's discounted fares on its Seattle-Reno route were likely to force
a LCC to abandon Seattle- Denver as well, the DOJ would consider whether
the airline anticipated recouping its losses by charging higher fares on both
routes. Fones says that the antitrust division looks "at the recoupment issue
first, and then proceed(s) to a cost analysis only if the conduct in question
satisfies the recoupment requirement. "s 8
With concurrent jurisdiction over the enforcement of federal antitrust
laws under the Federal Aviation Act, 9 the DOT is also authorized to issue
a cease and desist order to an airline, through an administrative hearing, ifthe
DOT concludes that an airline is engaging in "unfair competition." 6° If the
airline ignores the cease and desist order, fines can then be assessed.61 The
law does not define "unfair competition" for the DOT.Y
The DOT is also authorized to prohibit unfair methods of competition
by stopping air carriers from engaging in conduct that can be characterized
as anti-competitive under antitrust principles, even if it does not amount to
a violation under the antitrust laws.' The DOT has used its enforcement
powers to investigate several antitrust complaints, and has formulated a set
of guidelines known as the Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair
Exclusionary Conduct (Enforcement Policy).64 The Enforcement Policy was
designed to provide guidelines for the DOT to use while assessing
exclusionary conduct, but it has not been published as originally proposed.
Instead, the DOT has adopted the belief that "publishing... analyses and
developing standards through a case-by-case approach will be a more
effective way of proceeding. A 'one size fits all' approach won't work."6
57

ss

Id.
Id.

See 49 U.S.C. S 41309(c) (1996).
See Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,921 (Proposed Apr. 10, 1998).
6
See id.
62
See generally Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1301, et seq. (1996).
63
See 49 U.S.C. S 41712; Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the
Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,921.
6
SeeBeforetheSubcomm. onAviation, Comm. on Transportationandlnfiastructure,106th Cong. (1999)
(statement ofJohn Coleman, Director of Aviation Analysis. Department of Transportation, concerning
air transportation in Bangor, Maine), availableathttpVJ/tabula.ost.dot.gov/test/Coleman2.htm (on file with
author); see generally Enforcement Policy Regardihg Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air
Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,921.
65
Rodney E. Slater, U.S. Transportation Secretary Slater, In Address to Wings Club,
Recommends Continued DOT Focus on Airline Competition (Jan. 16,2001).
59
60
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While a case-by-case approach may be a more effective way to proceed,
it will require airlines to operate in a less certain environment.

D. The Resulting Oligopoly
While antitrust law that prevents collusion regulates the domestic airline
industry, it does not prevent an oligopolistic pricing model that invites
competitors to price their services in accordance with the prices of others in
the industry, also known as "conscious parallelism" pricing. 66 "Conscious
parallelism" pricing is done absent a "contract, combination, or conspiracy"
between the competing firms, which is a prerequisite to invoking § 1 of the
Sherman Act.67 Without some evidence ofan agreement, oligopolistic pricing
cannot be eliminated. 6' Since it is an oligopolistic industry, airlines do not
price their services based upon their marginal cost. Instead, the pricing
structure is based upon their competition, so long as they are profitable.
While meeting or beating the competition is traditionally welcomed,
competition can easily be observed and followed. Since airfare prices are
quickly matched, there is no incentive to price as low as possible.
The elevated prices that result from an oligopolistic market will lower
if the oligopoly is weakened by an increase in the number of competitors. A
study of 850 non-stop routes by a group of DOJ Antitrust Division
economists found that when airline competition in a market moves from
three to two equally sized market participants, prices rose by an average of
10%. A further decrease from two to one market participants raised prices
another 20% on average.69 The market concentration problem was largely
irrelevant before deregulation, because the Civil Aviation Board regulated
airfares to the level of being "just and reasonable," making monopoly profits
or predatory pricing impossible.7

66

See, e.g., Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37,41 (7th Cir.

1992) (parallel behavior in oligopoly fails to establish an agreement).
67
See id.
68
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAw oF COMPETITION AND
ITs PRACTICE 167 (2d ed., 1994). Hovenkamp writes:
Courts often say that parallel behavior alone does not establish an agreement unless the
plaintiffcan also show the presence ofcertain "plus factors" making the inference ofagreement
stronger. Relevant plus factors include such things as an oligopolistic market structure, advance
posting of parallel prices, a history of price fixing or exchange of price information.
69
See Gloria Hurdle et al., Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Aidine Industry, 38
J. INDUS. ECON. 119,120 (1989) noted in Robert D. Willig, Antitrust Lessons from theAirline Industry: The
DOJ Exqeience, 60 ANTTRUST LJ. 695 (1991).
70
See Andrew Goetz & Paul Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the
Air, 54J. AIR L.& COM. 927,934 (1989).
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In Europe, as of April 1, 1997, European Community member based
airlines have been granted cabotage rights within the European Community. 7 This, in combination with the privatization of state owned airlines, has
resulted in a considerable decrease in airfares, as well as an increase in the
availability and quality of service. If the United States were to grant cabotage
rights on a reciprocal basis with the airlines of other nations or groups of
nations (such as the EC), whose airlines provide international service to
United States' airports, the increased competition would result in a decrease
in domestic airfares, as well as new markets for all of the airlines involved.
For example, under cabotage with the EC, a U.S. airline could open up
an entire market to itself by providing service between a city-pair such as
Paris, France and Rome, Italy. Likewise, a European airline could fly
passengers to New York, and then continue on to Atlanta. Currently,
however, without a cabotage agreement, only an airline of the EC may fly
passengers from Paris to Rome. A U.S. airline cannot access routes between
two foreign destinations, and no foreign airline my fly between two
destinations within the U.S.
E. Foreign Ownership Restrictions
When the Civil Aviation Board (CAB)7 2 was dismantled in 1984 to
promote free market pricing, foreign control and ownership restrictions in
airlines were never changed. This barrier prevents foreign companies or
citizens from merging or acquiring more than 25% voting equity, or more
than 49% non-voting equity in a U.S. airline. Additionally, no more than one
third of an airline's board of directors may be foreigners.73 Unfortunately,
these restrictions also prevent foreign capital from supporting LCC's to any
great extent. 74

See Elliott, supra note 22, at 188.
The responsibilities of the CAB that were retained after deregulation are now the
responsibilities of the DOT. These responsibilities include safety, ownership restrictions, licensing, etc.
7
See Civil AeronauticsAct of 1938,49 U.S.C. SS 1301-1557 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (limiting nonU.S. citizens to 25% of an airline's voting stock). The foreign investment limits were originally passed as
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There exists an inextricable relationship between foreign investment
limitations and cabotage, because implementation would yield similar rights
at a certain level. If a foreign airline flies between two U.S. destinations,
cabotage rights are necessary. If cabotage rights are not available, a foreigner
owning a controlling stake in a U.S. airline could achieve the same results,
which under the current rules could not be a U.S. aircraft. Therefore, a
foreign national could provide U.S. domestic air service only if Congress
modified either the cabotage or the foreign ownership rule. The major
practical difference would be that in international air travel, a U.S. carrier
would fall under different treaties than a foreign carrier. Presumably, foreign
carriers could integrate their international service with domestic service
under either regime.
One of the biggest supporters of the United States adopting rules
permitting cabotage is Virgin Airways (Great Britain) chairman Richard
Branson, a British citizen limited by U.S. foreign ownership requirements.
Branson once stated:
It is really a ludicrous situation. When I open a Virgin Megastore in
New York, I am welcomed with open arms, just as Tower Records
is in London. But try to operate an air service between New York
and Boston, using U.S. aircraft and U.S. crew, and governments
75
scream that I am mad!
Branson aspires to begin service with a carrier he would name Virgin
76
America, which he claims "will give the big six some real competition."
While Branson clamors for the opportunity to compete with the big five
airlines, in reality the DOT may not think that he is truly mad. DOT
Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, Charles Hunnicut,
has asserted that the issue needs to be examined. Hunnicut, while attending
the 1998 Washington Deregulation 20 Summit, stated:
We have worked together to dismantle many of the restrictions that
some other countries have placed on international services. I think
the time has come for all of us to question restrictions that many
countries, including the USA, continue to impose on them. Do
those restrictions continue to make sense in light of the globalization
of markets for goods and services?"n
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Others at the DOT have voiced a different opinion, including Deputy
Secretary Mortimer Downey. At the "Aviation in the 21st Century - Beyond
Open Skies" conference held in Chicago, Illinois in December 1999, Deputy
Secretary Downey stated:
Virtually all countries prohibit carriage ofcabotage traffic by foreign
airlines, and we have reason to believe that this will be hard for many
countries to change anytime soon. In the U.S., the prohibition can
only be removed by Congress, and the issue incites strong reaction
within the aviation community. Given the obstacles to establishing
a viable operation in a foreign country, and particularly in the
dynamic competitive situation of the US, we question the extent to
which foreign carriers really want or really use cabotage rights.7"
As for foreign investment, Deputy Secretary Downey remarked, "[s]ome
liberalizing of foreign investment - especially among truly privatized carriers
- might be of value in promoting a more open international aviation
regime."79
While some U.S. carriers, including Federal Express, support the lifting
of cabotage restrictions with reciprocal rights,' the largest hurdle may be
labor organizations. The U.S. Airline Pilots Association has spoken out
against cabotage. Their national president, Randolph Babbitt, fearing the loss
ofjobs to foreign pilots, stated that he "cannot fathom" a reason to support
U.S. cabotage.8 1 Branson attempts to diffuse the labor issue by establishing
that Virgin America would employ 100% U.S. personnel in the cockpit and
on the ground,
but that promise is not likely to comfort the fears of labor
2
associations.
Herb Kelleher, the chairman and chief executive of Southwest Airlines
also sees the likelihood of cabotage rules coming to the United States as
unlikely. When Kelleher was asked about his opinion of cabotage in the
United States, he replied:
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I don't think that it will ever happen. It does not make any difference
to Southwest one way or another, quite frankly. But I do wonder
how the foreign carriers could provide lower fares against the more
cost-efficient U.S. carriers. I cannot see BA (British Airways) or a
Lufthansa, if they were allowed to serve the U.S. more freely,
wafting a 747 from Munich to New York, then going on to
Richmond. But if they want to do that, it's fine by me.'
While the DOT maintains that it should "[r]educe barriers to the
creation of global aviation systems, such as limitations on cross-border
investments whenever possible,"" the Department of Defense (DOD) is
against the relaxation of rules limiting foreign ownership of U.S. carriers. s
During a debate at the Sky Harbor International Aviation Symposium in
Phoenix, Arizona in May 1999, DOD Assistant Deputy Undersecretary Mary
Lou McHugh stated that changes in U.S. airline ownership rules could have
"many ramifications" for the DOD's airlift capabilities during a time of
crisis.' Under the DOD's Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, U.S.
airlines agree to have their aircraft and crew available for troop and cargo
transfer during emergencies.87 Airlines volunteer for the program on a yearto-year basis, and are paid when the CRAF system is activated. The DOD
believes that foreign-owned airlines would not be as willing or as reliable
volunteers as United States owned airlines." McHugh stated "[w]e feel
comfortable with the current situation. During times of crisis we need to
know without question that there is support. As we explore airline ownership
issues, we must keep U.S. national security foremost in our minds."8 The
DOD relies on the 725 aircraft signed up for CRAF for approximately 41%
of its cargo movements and 93% of its troop movements during a major
conflict. CRAF was last activated during the Gulf War.'
The feelings on the subject of the relaxation of foreign ownership are not
positive with some policymakers in Europe either. Dr. Ralph Fennes,
directorate general VII (transport policy) at the European Commission,
83
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believes that the next logical step is not the relaxation of foreign ownership
limits, but the creation of a "strong multilateral framework across the
Atlantic." 9' Tony Baker, the director of International Aviation Negotiations
at the United Kingdom Department of Transport, cites the takeover of Air
UK by KLM Airlines (Netherlands) as evidence that globalization is already
taking place.' Baker asserted the importance of safety issues and the hope
that flags of convenience would not occur in the airline industry as they had
in the shipping industry, before concluding that "change in ownership rules
is maybe an idea whose time has come. "93
The current criterion in negotiating international air transport
agreements of protecting the citizen airlines of a nation is anachronistic and
expensive. The question the United States government should ask is: what
is the justification for shielding U.S. airlines from foreign competition? The
lower airfares that would result from true deregulation would result in
substantial savings on airfares, as well as increased travel, which are
efficiencies the entire economy could benefit from.
'While the U.S. domestic airline industry enjoys its oligopoly, it has no
desire to see the United States pursue cabotage agreements on a widespread
level. 'With the political muscle of the airline industry (and lack of political
muscle and education on this complex subject among private citizens), the
U.S. Senate would undoubtedly be slow to ratify an agreement providing for
reciprocal cabotage with other nations. One way to structure an agreement
to be more palatable to the domestic airline industry would be for the United
States to deal directly with a group of nations such as the European Union
(EU). The Association of European Airlines in its Transatlantic Common
Aviation Area (TCAA) statement proposes such an agreement.' The TCAA
proposal provides for sweeping changes to the current "Open Skies"
framework by liberalizing cabotage and foreign ownership restrictions on a
reciprocal basis between the United States and the EU.95 If an agreement
such as the TCAA is eventually adopted between the United States and the
EU, rather than individual European nations, the European market for U.S.
carriers will be greatly increased, making a reciprocal cabotage agreement far
more equitable to U.S. carriers. The potential for name branded airlines with
considerable financial backing to be able to effectively compete with U.S.
domestic airlines would lower U.S. domestic airfares significantly. U.S.
carriers would also have the opportunity to increase their own profitability
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by providing service within foreign countries. Eventually, other large nations
or groups of small nations could enter into agreements with each other, with
airlines creating "hub" and "spoke" systems on an international scale.
F. Antitrust Immunity
In 1992, the DOT officially defined "Open Skies" agreements and
solicited foreign nations to enter into such agreements with the United
States. % When the United States signs an "Open Skies" agreement with a
foreign nation, the agreement allows for the airlines of each nation to provide
as much air service as desired between the two countries.' If an "Open
Skies" agreement is reached with a carrier's home country, the DOT offers
antitrust immunity to a foreign carrier who combines service with a U.S.
carrier, 98 in order to permit antitrust immune cooperation in areas such as
pricing, revenue sharing, and strategy." This permits each airline that is a
part of the alliance to be a part of a more comprehensive route structure and
to offer flights to more destinations.
The antitrust immunity that the DOT provides to airline alliances
ignores an opportunity to have airline competition in the United States in the
future.'l ° The DOT is eliminating competition between domestic and
foreign airlines that may compete with each other in the future or may have
done so in the past."0 While the DOT initially approved alliances with
antitrust immunity to help smaller airlines compete with the larger
international air carriers, the emphasis has now shifted to creating alliances
that compete with each other. As a result, the number of international
alliances is also raising concerns about the potential effect on the competitive
structure of the U.S. domestic airline industry.' 2
The Federal Aviation Act vests the Secretary of Transportation with the
power to grant antitrust immunity at his or her discretion, when it is in the
public interest.'0 3 Additionally, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act, the
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Secretary of Transportation must approve cooperative agreements and
requests. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
The Secretary ofTransportation shall approve an agreement, request,
modification, or cancellation referred to in subsection (a)
[subsection (a) contains the filing procedures] of this section when
the Secretary finds it is not adverse to the public interest and is not
in violation of this part. However, the secretary shall disapprove(1) or, after periodic review, end approval of, an agreement, request,
modification, or cancellation, that substantially reduces or
eliminates competition unless the Secretary finds that(A) the agreement, request, modification, or cancellation is
necessary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve
important public benefits (including international comity
and foreign policy considerations); and
(B) the transportation need cannot be met or those benefits
cannot be achieved by reasonably available alternatives that
are materially less anti-competitive'°4
Of course, as the statute provides, the Secretary of the DOT may rescind
the antitrust immunity that was previously granted."c~ While this could create
new competition between airlines that would no longer be able to cooperate,
the integrity and predictability of the DOT and its rulemaking process would
be tarnished, which is essential to the viability and growth of the airline
industry. Additionally, if individual airlines were to lose antitrust immunity,
they may not be able to adapt quickly enough to maintain viability as a
market competitor, resulting in airline failures and even less competition.
IV. THE ANTITRUST IMMUNE PARTNERS

The Netherlands became the first country to reach an "Open Skies"
agreement with the United States, and an antitrust immune alliance between
Northwest Airlines and KLM airlines immediately followed." Each carrier
is now able to access flights within each others network, and they can also
offer a transatlantic flight between the United States and the Netherlands
when only one of them is actually flying. This essentially reduces the
number of flights between the United States and the Netherlands, but the
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fact that these nations have "Open Skies" agreements will allow another
carrier, from either nation, to absorb any reduction in capacity.
Lufthansa Airlines (Germany) and United Airlines also have antitrust
immunity, where revenue is not yet shared, but where each airline keeps the
profits from the service it provides. °7 'While this alliance prevents Lufthansa
from benefiting financially from U.S. domestic air travel (and vice-versa for
United Airlines in Germany), it prevents the two airlines from competing on
their international routes."° The airlines generate traffic for each other,
increasing their own profitability and reducing competition.' °9 United
Airlines and Lufthansa Airlines will soon be creating revenue sharing
agreements within their alliance, beginning with their Chicago-Duesseldorf
route. 110
Through the granting of antitrust immunity, the DOT is eliminating
potential competition today, as well as competition that would be gained if
a regime of reciprocal cabotage were pursued, instead of the less competitive
"Open Skies" agreements that promote alliances. KLM could potentially be
offering service in competition with Northwest Airlines, but instead the U.S.
government is fostering a cartel between them.
In 1992, British Airways announced plans with US Air (currently US
Airways) to create an alliance that involved an integration of operations into
a global master brand."' This would have granted US Air access to the
plethora ofworldwide destinations that British Airways services and it would
have brought British Airways access to the many routes that US Air flies
within the United States. The greatest problem with the agreement was the
lack of reciprocity. Not only was British Airways unwilling to relinquish
some of its precious few gates in the United Kingdom to U.S. carriers, but
the U.S. carriers were unhappy as well."' At the prodding of United, Delta,
and American Airlines, as well as Federal Express, the DOT refused to
approve the proposed investment on citizenship grounds." 3 American
Airlines indicated that they felt that even if reciprocal cabotage was agreed to,
it was not a fair agreement, as the United States has 40% of the world market,
and Britain has only a small fraction of that. American Airlines also claimed
that even if the entire EC agreed to reciprocal cabotage, it only amounted to
between 10-12% of the market, which was less valuable due to the strong
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ground transportation network in Europe, and a lack of airport facilities that
could sustain a high volume of traffic.' 1 4 The American Airlines statement
makes clear that at least one domestic U.S. airline would rather not compete
too hard for additional business. Nonetheless, the statement fails to consider
the potential growth areas in Europe and beyond that could be exploited
through the experience of U.S. domestic airlines in a relatively deregulated
regime.
Since then, American Airlines has itself attempted to form an antitrust
immune alliance with British Airways, but the DOT rejected antitrust
immunity because the United Kingdom had not agreed to an acceptable
"Open Skies" agreement."' The two airlines will be hindered from
coordinating ticket pricing and schedules, but they have stated that they
remain committed to linked frequent flier programs and shared terminal
6
facilities through their non-antitrust immune Oneworld airline alliance.1
Cooperative alliances without antitrust immunity, also referred to as
codeshares,1 7 are questionable from a legal standpoint. One unnamed
attorney stated, "These codeshare alliances are defacto mergers. They can be
seen as a way to get around the antitrust laws. That is what the DOT and
DOJ will be looking at." Other attorneys have given the opinion that even
coordinated frequent flier programs could be regarded as overstepping the
boundaries of U.S. antitrust law." 8
Without cabotage, foreign airlines have no opportunity to compete with
in the U.S. domestic airline industry. The current antitrust immunities that
are being granted reduce competition on today's international routes, and if
cabotage is ever granted within the United States, airlines will have to
transform their entire businesses in order to be competitive.
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V. MERGERS AND AcQUIS1TONS

Under a regime of reciprocal cabotage or liberalized foreign investment,
widespread consolidation may become prevalent. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for the DOJ to permit widespread mergers and acquisitions
between airlines in a deregulated airline industry and maintain competition.
Even if airlines don't compete in a certain market, it is too easy for an airline
to completely change the market that it competes in. Often a market can be
delineated by only the time of a certain flight, and a new market may require
only a change in schedule, let alone service to a third city. Airlines would be
able to merge or acquire, and then change their services, reducing
competition in the markets served by both airlines in the past.
Mergers and acquisitions can also be healthy for competition. If a failing
firm needs to combine in order to survive and continue competing, a merger
or acquisition makes sense. One way to decrease the competitive impact of
mergers and acquisitions is for the DOJ to issue special guidelines regarding
mergers and acquisitions that are particularly tailored to the airline industry.
Another alternative is for the DOT to fully enforce 49 U.S.C. S 41712,
which allows the DOT to stop airline conduct that violates antitrust
principles, without an antitrust law violation." 9 One possible method of
enforcement is for particular destinations that would experience reduced
competition to automatically have their affected routes given or sold to
another airline that does not currently provide service upon that particular
route, applicable even after a merger or acquisition is completed.
One significant barrier that U.S. airlines have to mergers and acquisitions
is their labor unions. The Airline Pilots Association is generally in opposition
to mergers and acquisitions because, according to Kit Darby, president of
consulting company Air Inc., "[miergers and buy-outs leave the seniority
issue wide open and a pilot can find himself starting all over again.
Consequently, pilots have an almost unnatural fear of mergers. It's the
number one issue, whether it's on the domestic level or international." 20
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VI. RECENT PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

Recently, some initiatives of the DOT to combat the anti-competitive
nature of the domestic airline industry have been rewarded. Early in 2000,
JetBlue Airways established limited domestic service across the Eastern
seaboard, based at New York City's underutilized John F. Kennedy
International Airport. JetBlue is the best financed start-up airline in the
United States since deregulation, having ordered twenty-five new Airbus
A320's. The aircraft features 162 leather seats, individual television monitors,
and one class of service. Even with all of the amenities, JetBlue claims its
average fares are 65% lower than those previously existing in the markets
served.'
The continued success of start-up airlines such as JetBlue depends on
available airport capacity. Airports are already crowded in the United States,
and a potential increase in flights will almost certainly lead to a "crowded

skies" problem. While the domestic airlines currently dominate large airports
and many gates with their large "hub" and "spoke" systems, many foreign
airlines have only a few gates in major airports. In order to be competitive in
the U.S., foreign airlines will have to create true "hub" and "spoke" systems,
resulting in a shortage of airport capacity. The airport infrastructure will be
forced to grow in order to safely accommodate an increase in air travel.
In order to facilitate the required airport growth, airlines must be
sensitive to air quality and noise considerations. While the exhaust pollution

given off by more flights may be countered by a reduction in long distance
automobile trips, the effects on air quality need to be considered, as well as
the noise pollution airplanes create. In Europe, the reduction of exhaust and
122
noise pollution is already being addressed with stricter regulations.
VII. CONCLUSION

A scheme incorporating cabotage and reduced or eliminated foreign
investment requirements should be implemented bilaterally on a reciprocal
basis. The TCAA proposal by the Association of European Airlines, if
implemented, would be an excellent framework for United States and EU
cooperation, hopefully providing an example for other regions to follow.
While a start-up LCC airline like JetBlue is encouraging, it will be
increasingly difficult for a newcomer to become established and prosper
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among the class of giant sized airlines that the DOT is grooming. The only
way that a competitive, growing market can take hold with a considerable,
long-term effect on price and service is if domestic and foreign airlines are
able to individually establish competing hub and spoke systems on a
domestic and international level, while in compliance with the antitrust laws.
If the DOT continues to grant antitrust immunity to airlines, sanctioning the
equivalent of cartel agreements at the expense of consumers, the barriers to
entry in the airline industry will continue to rise.
Cabotage and the elimination of foreign investment requirements alone
cannot create a competitive airline industry. Only when combined with the
vigorous enforcement of existing antitrust laws and the expansion of airports
to meet competitors demands, can the United States foster a competitive and
efficient market that will allow the airline industry to continue to grow while
protecting air travel consumers.
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